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Abstract. In this article author introduced project about Ukraine in the period of
retreat of the German administration and army during World War II. At first author giving
an introduction into his interest and research questions which he combined with a
multidimensional approach of various perspectives. Further more, a short introduction in
his different sources is given.
In the second part author presenting some examples of an important aspect of his
research: the relationship between German army and administration, partisans and the
population in Ukraine. As a last step researcher introduced some of temporary results.
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УКРАЇНА У 1943-1944 рр.: РІШЕННЯ ПІД ЧАС ВІДСТУПУ НІМЕЦЬКИХ
ВІЙСЬК
Анотація. У даній статті автор представив проект про Україну у період
відступу німецької адміністрації та армії під час Другої світової війни. Спочатку
автор вводить до сфери його інтересів і дослідницьких питань, які вичаються ним
у поєднанні з багатовимірним підходом різноманітних точок зору. Також подається
огляд використаних джерел.
У другій частині автор висвітлює деякі приклади важливого аспекту його
дослідження: відносини між німецькою армією й адміністрацією, партизанами та
населенням в Україні. У якості останнього кроку дослідник навів опис отриманих
результатів.
Ключові слова: Україна, Друга світова війна, окупація, партизани, німецька
адміністрація.
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УКРАИНА В 1943-1944 гг.: РЕШЕНИЯ ВО ВРЕМЯ ОСТУПЛЕНИЯ НЕМЕЦКИХ
ВОЙСК
Аннотация. В этой статье автор представил проект об Украине в период
отступления немецкой администрации и армии во время Второй мировой войны.
Вначале автор дает введение в его интерес и исследовательские вопросы, которые
он изучает в сочетании с многомерным подходом различных точек зрения. Более
того, дается обзор использованных источников.
Во второй части автор, представляет некоторые примеры важного аспекта
его исследования: отношения между немецкой армией и администрацией, партизан
и населения в Украине. В качестве последнего шага исследователь представил
некоторые из временных результатов.
Ключевые слова: Украина, Вторая мировая война, оккупация, партизаны, немецкая
администрация.
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I take a close look at the time in which the Germans retreated from Ukraine in World War II
(WW2). There is a number of phenomenons which can be seen as special for this period of the war,
which are striking and therefor need to be analyzed as such. These phenomenons include the
evacuation and deportation of great parts of the population, robbery and destruction of goods and
equipment (industry and agriculture), furthermore the struggle against partisans and within this means
of terror and “vengeance” against the biggest part of the population, which above consisted of
burning down villages.
At the same time the partisan movement [In this article I am focussing on Soviet and communist
partisans] in Ukraine was growing rapidly. In the organizations and groups that cooperated with and
worked for the Germans such as the Schutzmannschaften, the Polizei and the Hiwis (Hilfswillige)
desertion, sabotage and escape became widespread. Further more, the leftover  population was
less and less willing to support the Germans with delivering goods [5, s. 97].
Speaking of the situation of retreat of the Germans and it’s specific aspects, it’s important to
stress that these are in many terms different than those in 1941. The first years of WW2 until now
have been researched more often, while there is no single monograph about the time of german
retreat itself in german or english language. For nowadays public in Germany we can claim that there
is very little knowledge about the dimensions of destruction and war crimes in former Soviet Union
and today’s Ukraine.
First of all, it’s not always easy to be sure what is being talked about when we speak of
“Ukraine”. While doing this, I refer to the state territory of Ukraine today. My research, though, is
concentrated on one administrational unit of what the german occupiers called “Reichskommissariat
Ukraine”, the former “Kreisgebiet Shitomir”, which more or less consisted of what is today Oblasts
Vinnica and Zhitomir.
For the Wehrmacht defending the Dnieper-Line was highly important [8, s. 47-49, s. 269;
10, s. 1041]. Basically after the defeat of Stalingrad winning the war was hardly something to be
expected. During the second half of 1943 by the so called “Operation Zitadelle” the Germans
carried out “one of the last tries to protect the threat of defeat by an offensive in the southern section
of the eastern front” [15, s. 90]. When it became clear that this plan did not succeed and the Red
Army was crossing the Dnieper, we can talk of a retreat more than ever. The Wehrmacht as
well as the civil administration at this point did not doubt fulfilling the measures that were
connected to this. In this situation many territories again became areas of operations of the
Wehrmacht and therefor were ruled by the army. In my considerations I focus on the turn of the
year 1943/44, because during this phase an increase of certain war measures can be observed.
Still, the course of action of the Germans can not only be characterized as “panic”. In the
average they tried to fulfill an exact plan, with sometimes more and sometimes less success.
This plan consisted among other things of the so called “ARLZ-Maßnahmen” (Auflockerung,
Räumung, Lähmung, Zerstцrung). These were tactical and strategical means that resulted from
a direction of the Wirtschaftsstabs Ost and summarized those means, that were to be carried out
in case of eviction. The aim was to leave the enemy as little work force, potential soldiers, groceries,
raw materials and industrial facilities [11, s. 389].
I approach this situation by using various different historical sources regarding intention,
situation and reception of the events. I find these in several German (Bundesarchiv,
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg, Institut für Zeitgeschichte München and others) as
Ukrainian (regional archives of Vinnica and Zhitomir Region, TsDAGO, TsDAVO and others)
archives. Further more, I research in villages of the Oblasts Vinnica and Zhitomir, conduct interviews
with witnesses and ask to see local documents.
In my analysis I emphasize on the relationship between intention and situation during the
situation described. I look at decisions of various players considering their different backgrounds
(experience and history of the societies they come from).
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Within the German civil administration as in the army major disagreements regarding the relation
to the Ukrainian population occurred during all years of the occupation and corresponding conflicts
that were often led openly. The voices of those who, out of tactical considerations, had doubts
about the brutality of the occupation, however almost completely lost their relevance under the
primate of alleged necessity of the army. In a fundamental order regarding the “Bandenbekдmpfung”
[struggle with bandits], the general staff officer of Heeresgruppe Sьd on 30th of April 1943 demands
“drastic action also against supporters of bandits [Partisans]” [7, bl. 41]. Erich Friderici, general in
command of the security troups and commander in the Heeresgebiet Sьd, on 1st of August 1943
ordered regarding the desertion of Hilfswilligen (Hiwis) and members of “state-owned units” and
targeted murder of German Soldiers, that as means of vengeance “5-10 times the amount of russian
blood” to be flown. For this not only persons were to be prosecuted, who participated in assaults,
but also those “who considering their behavior are being seen as potential fulfillers of such deeds”.
“Narrow minded legal considerations” must, says Friderici, “step back behind the absolute necessity
to make an example on the spot [...]” [6, s. 24-28]. With this he made clear that it was potentially
the whole population could be targeted by repressions, if the commander felt this to be a necessity.
In many cases the Wehrmacht adjusted a behavior that followed these instructions.
Within the German institutions which dealt with the war situation and security policies, one
partially spoke a very clear speech that hardly tried to cover up the precarious situation of the
Germans. In these reports – and compared to propaganda leaflets and speeches – a rather realistic
view was asked for in order to accordingly adjust the warfare. To stretch one example, Oskar
Mьller, representative of the Reichsministeriums fьr die besetzten Ostgebiete at the
Oberkommando [high command] der Heeresgruppe Sьd, on November 1st 1943 states:
“The situation regarding bandits is alarming. Night after night assaults take place in areas that so far
have been absolutely pacified. We have to reckon with the bandits will spread activity further on. […]
The mood of the population is […] depressed due to the military events und the hard means
of evacuation. Since during the ruthless evictions of territories threatened by the enemy villages,
economic businesses and supplies that could not be taken back must have set on fire and cattle been
shot, the population in some places took side against us. The afflux to the bandits though this was
was not insignificant. Also during the repatriation due to insufficient guard of the civil population,
ongoing defect of the bandits could be determined. A greater part of the population, even
Volksdeutsche, […] deprived from evacuation. […]
In general in the current Heeresgebiet we can determine, that the rural population neither
clearly supports the Bolsheviks nor the german occupation force. Their orientate their behavior only
by estimating by whom they would have to expect less inconveniences in case they do not deliver
their products to the other side. [...]” [4, s. 92-95].
It appears here that within the Wehrmacht a quite realistic view on the war situation indeed
existed: In fact it was more it less desperate, also the changing mood of the population can be
comprehended by various other documents. Finally, the means of terror, which affected a big part of
the population, are a possible reason for the support of partisans. The observation of the rural
population sticking to whomever to expect less repressions of, is remarkable. Even though this is an
invalid generalization, correlating statements can be found especially in several interviews with former
(and nowadays) peasants conducted recently in central Ukraine.
An interviewee who was born in 1934 from Zarichani, a small village north of the city of
Ћitomir, reports about compulsorily hosting three Germans she remembers as “Hans, Jopseph and
Rudi”, while her family would have lived in a nearby hut. In the house the Germans, to whom she had
lively contact, would have cleaned weapons. During the night Partisans would have come to pick up
potatoes and bread, one time she would have hidden three injured partisans in the attic. When the
Germans would already have been escaped from the Red Army, the village elder would have
denounced them, whereupon Ukrainians would have shot the partisans [1].
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Also among those who joined the partisans, several different considerations influenced their
decisions. Commonly, the concrete experience with realities of the german occupation had its impact,
likewise there was a certain percentage of convinced communists, who wanted to take revenge for
their killed relatives and friends. However, many sources deliver evidence of rather pragmatically
calculated decisions that in a first way aimed for simple survival. An Ukrainian, whom the Germans
supposedly wanted to recruit, in being quoted in a report on partisans in Vinnica: “You know, I have
to go underground and into the partisan unit, else they will eliminate me” [12, s. 82-83].
With whom the local population got in contact with strongly depended on their place of
residence. In many areas the Germans were not present permanently, but made local Ukrainians
realize their policies. In some cases the Germans only showed up, when they confiscated groceries
and other goods. In these areas the chances for a development and support of local partisan groups
were bigger than elsewhere. In some places a strong identification with the partisans developed and
can be experienced until today in interviews. In other cases todays memories of the partisans are
rather negative, mostly because of the confiscation of groceries and other goods, which sometimes
took place in a brutal manner.
Reading the post-war-reports and memories written for the Soviet officials, one gets the
picture of the partisan activities as a struggle of the people (Народная борьба): “Literally the
whole population supported the partisans and joined them, they gave them all sorts of support”
[13, s. 36-37].
This kind of description corresponds to the heroisation and mystical stylization of partisans
in Soviet Union especially from the 1960s on. However, with sources available today it is
possible to draw a multi-faceted and -dimensional picture of their realities that includes many
difficulties and problems they faced.
The commander of the 2nd partisan brigade “Stalin” writes on intensified partisan activities
in the forests in late 1943: “It was not an easy task... The activities were isolated and sometimes
doubled, which demonstrates the lack of one single center. The idea of united forces developed
in 1943, but the Gestapo became a brutal regime that sent out provocateurs in all organizations,
in which only a small number of people worked. In this way a unification was virtually impossible”
[12, s. 91-103].
Here the missing central coordination of the partisan struggle as well as the repressions
by the Gestapo are being named. In another report ongoing difficulties to collect products are
being mentioned. Also, the relationship with the population is being described as partially bad:
“The population didn’t support us. It’s hostile part helped the Germans to beat us, to shatter
the dream […]” [14, s. 1].
The partly complex and not always clear relationship between the population and the partisans
is expressed in accounts from Pen’kivka, a village that was burned down by the Germans after a
partisan attack, and in which dozens of people were killed.
During different interviews in Pen’kivka, people often – and quite prideful – stress being a
“partisan village”. The partisans, however, who had carried out this attack, would have been “other”
partisans then “ours”. The “own” partisans would have come from the village Pen’kivka. They
would not have participated on this action, but part of the partisan devision “Lenin”, which was
active in the region [2]. Behind the village Brusliniv would have been a forest, the so called black
forest, where a partisan camp made of clay houses would have existed. The division between “our”
and “other” partisans among the inhabitants of the village is important also because it finds its
continuation on type and of actions and how they have been carried out: “Our partisans did not
attack. […]. They have printed some leaflets and spread information, also they beat the village
elderly. […] But they did not take such radical steps” [2].
One interviewee states out that there was harsh critique of inhabitants regarding the mentioned
attack on the Germans. She quotes one of them that she herself once interviewed and who was in
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direct contact with members of the partisan unit, because they would have settled in their and the neighbor’s
apartments to prepare the attack. She directly would have spoken to the partisans: “Why do you want to
attack the Germans right here? Attack them in another place!” She would have pleased to no not attack
the Germans out of the village, because she would have known that afterwards something terrible would
happen. She would have been offered then to become a partisan herself and come along, but would have
denied because of her children she had to take care of. They would not have listened to her, and so many
inhabitants would have been very angry and disappointed about the partisans. Also, a partisan commander
would have been killed during the attack [2].
Despite these difficulties the knowledge of the Red Army approaching provided courage and
strength. The development of the war situation confirmed the fighters many times to have taken the
right decision, even though ambivalences were under no circumstances forgotten: “The heart was
filled with pleasure and fear. The struggle stopped. The Germans had retreated far, until Vasil’kov.
The retreat of the Germans went so quick they did not manage to burn down neither our nor other
villages. […] It seemed as if we were born again, risen to new life” [3, s. 18].
During a long period the relationship between the Germans and the population in Ukraine was
to a certain extent ambiguous – except for it’s big jewish part especially in nowadays Western
Ukraine, which was extinguished in great parts in 1941 and 1942 already. During the situation of
retreat this relationship came to certainty rapidly in a process of brutalization of the warfare. Hence
a disambiguation of fronts and accompanying decisions took place as well. “The syndrome of time
pressure, strategic failure, problems of supply, disdain of the population, antisemitism and increasing
resistance broke in a rapidly developing radicalization within a few weeks”, as the historian Ulrich
Herbert puts it [9, s. 36]. The desperation of the situation of the Germans itself didn’t make them
give in, but increase means of destruction. Internalized ideology made the members of german units
think of what was still to be done, and after their defeat might never be possible to do. Therefore
especially those, who had a rather realistic view of their own defeat did not necessarily get to act in
a more rational way, but in contrary partly pushed a radicalization and brutalization. As mentioned
before, the terror during this phase was directed against a big part of the population that did not
actively cooperate with the Germans.
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